I. INTRODUCTION
The Northeast Arctic (NEA) cod (Gadus morhua) fishery in the Barents Sea was as of 2016 the most valuable whitefish fishery in the world. Dried cod from Lofoten has been a highly priced export commodity since the Viking ages. Today, Russia and Norway agree on the annual total allowable catch (TAC) quota and its distribution. While the Russian and European fleets (obtaining roughly 50%-60% of the total TAC) predominantly consist of trawlers, this is not the case for the Norwegian fleet. Rather, the bulk is smaller boats with passive gear that exploit the cod's impressive spawning migration to the coastal areas, especially around Lofoten. Access to this coastal fishery was basically open, and the international TAC was not enforced on coastal vessels until 1989. At that time the cod stock had reached a record low, and the Norwegian authorities pulled the emergency brake; the fishery was stopped in the peak of the season on April 18, 1989. Since then, the authorities have severely restricted fishing by allocating individual quotas and enforcing the TAC more consistently. Subsequently, the cod stock recovered and profits have gone up. In a nutshell, we ask: Were these increases in biomass and profits due to good luck or good management?
Individual quota systems in various forms have now been used for more than 30 years, and their use has increased in scope and scale in the recent decade. Simultaneously, there has been a lively debate around this type of fisheries management, in particular when individual quotas are tradable (ITQs), see, for example, Bromley (2009) and the subsequent commentaries. Many studies have pointed to the positive economic effects of ITQ management (see, e.g., Grafton, Squires, and Fox 2000; Fox et al. 2003; Dupont et al. 2005; Arnason 2005; Schnier and Felthoven 2013; Reimer, Abbott, and Wilen 2014) , whereas ecological effects appear to be more mixed (Branch 2009; Chu 2009) .
Generally, case studies that analyze time series in an attempt to test whether privatization or regulation of common property tends to improve profits face the fundamental problem of correctly identifying the causal effect of policy change; There are neither controlled nor natural experiments for large fisheries. First of all, identifying a treatment effect by randomization is infeasible because of spillover effects. Second, the specific natural and social context of a given fishery makes it virtually impossible to find an adequate control among the set of other fisheries. Lastly, technological developments and, in particular, environmental changes obstruct even the comparison of economic units before and after the regulatory change.
It is this last aspect that we address in this paper: fish stocks, and consequently profits, might have risen due to the policy change, but also due to more favorable environmental conditions. Therefore, we build an age-structured bioeconomic model to simulate the counterfactual development of the fish stock and economic outcomes, assuming no regulatory change, in other words, that the relationship between stock and harvest did not change. The idea is to utilize the estimated recruitment to the actual population after the intervention, since recruitment is the main source of environmentally induced fluctuations. We assume that the counterfactual recruitment in a year would have been the observed factual recruitment, adjusted by the stock-recruitment curve according to the counterfactual spawning stock. The counterfactual stock is then projected forward, subject to observed natural mortality and counterfactual fishing mortality.
Methodologically, our approach is related to the "synthetic control" analysis that has been pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and applied to nonrenewable natural resources by Mideksa (2013) and to fisheries by Scheld, Anderson, and Uchida (2012) . Here, we construct the counterfactual control not by propensity matching, but by simulating a bioeconomic model. 1 The first objective of our study is to analyze the effect of the 1989/ 1990 policy change on cod biomass. The second objective is to analyze the effect on profits. We do so by taking a structural model of 1 Scheld, Anderson, and Uchida (2012) can use the synthetic control method because in their case there were indeed some boats in the fishery that participated in the program while others did not, and they can convincingly make the case that the other boats had no incentive to, and indeed did not, change their behavior. Moreover, they can abstract from the biological aspects because they focus on within-season dynamics. In our case, all boats were directly or indirectly affected by the policy, and the biological dynamics are a key aspect of our study. a profit function to an extended dataset of boat-owner combinations in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery. After demonstrating that introducing individual quotas has indeed had a positive and significant effect on profits, we investigate how abolishing the open-access regime has lead to increased profits.
The 1989/1990 policy change has been referred to as "closing the commons" (Hersoug 2005) . At this point, it is important to emphasize that it is the fact that overall harvest is being constrained (and not per se the introduction of individual quotas as a way of allocating the TAC) that has an effect on the stock development. However, the issuing of individual quotas was an integral part of a general policy change that allowed the authorities to enforce the TAC for coastal vessels also. Controlling the harvest of coastal vessels is an important condition for the increase in cod biomass, as these vessels primarily target the cod's spawning stock and thus directly affect the stock's renewability. It is the lower TAC and its stricter enforcement that we pick up in the first part of our analysis, and it is the combined effect of stricter total quotas and more secure harvesting rights that we analyze in the second part of our study.
The two papers most closely related to our study are by Kjesbu et al. (2014) and GomezLobo, Peña Torres, and Barría (2011). Kjesbu et al. (2014) analyze a later management change, namely the introduction of a "harvestcontrol rule" (HCR). They give an excellent introduction to the natural environment and the current status of the NEA cod and argue that the reduction of fishing mortality was, in part, responsible for the high stock values in recent years. To answer how the cod stock would have evolved were it not for the HCR, or were the HCR introduced earlier, they simulate a biological model. In contrast to Kjesbu et al. (2014) , we predict counterfactual recruitment by using counterfactual spawning stock as input in the estimated recruitment relationship, and we take into account that the aggregate harvest rate changes with the level of biomass. Moreover, our emphasis is on the economic dynamics. Similar to our approach, Gomez-Lobo, Peña Torres, and Barría (2011) use the residuals from an estimated model to assess the effect of the Chilean ITQ regime by FIGURE 1 Observed Biomass and Total Landings of Northeast Arctic Cod, 1946 , Showing the 1989 /1990 way of simulating a scenario with and without ITQs. Our study differs from that of GomezLobo, Peña Torres, and Barría (2011) in that it (1) takes into account that the policy change has an effect on the stock development and (2) compares the counterfactual biomass and profits to the historically observed values instead of comparing a with-ITQ and a without-ITQ simulation.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to combine the assessment of an introduction of individual quotas with an explicit simulation of the counterfactual resource base, thereby disentangling the effects of policy reform and environmental changes. That said, we are well aware of the gulf between the power of a randomized controlled experiment and the evidence that our study might bring. Nevertheless, we take a step toward better understanding the effect of changing the fishery rights regime in an important fishery. Given the central role of institutions for economic performance, we believe that the case study of the Norwegian coastal fishery is of substantial general interest.
II. BACKGROUND
At first sight, the development of the NEA cod stock could serve as a textbook example of open access and fisheries management. Biomass has declined from more than 4 million tons after WWII to less than 1 million in the 1980s. At the same time, the stock's age structure has been severely truncated, making the stock more susceptible to climatic variation (Rouyer et al. 2011) . After the introduction of individual quotas in 1989/1990, the trend turned, and aggregate biomass has reached values above 3 million tons once more (Figure 1) .
Two boat groups are distinguished in the Norwegian cod fishery: trawlers and vessels with passive gear (the so-called conventional fleet). The latter group is the backbone of the Norwegian fishing fleet, landing around 70% of the cod harvest. Trawlers have always been subject to a licensing scheme, while access for conventional boats has traditionally been open. Since 1977, the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission has agreed upon a TAC quota, with about 10% to 15% allocated to third countries and the remainder shared equally between the two nations. 2 However, the quota was de facto not enforced for conventional vessels (Christensen and Hallenstvedt 2005) . 3 This situation changed radically when the resource stock was in such a dire state that the Norwegian authorities closed the fishery on April 18, 1989. After this shock, the unanimous slogan was "Never again April 18th!" (Hersoug 2005 ). In the autumn of the same year, the authorities issued individual vessel quotas in order to achieve a fair distribution of fishing opportunities. The aim was to avoid an Olympic race for the low TAC that was set for 1990. 4 Although the vessel quotas were by no means popular among the fishers at that time, and all the major parties saw them as a "temporary response to the resource crisis" (Hersoug, Holm, and Rånes 2000, 325) , they persist. We argue that the policy change has created a privileged group of fishers that, vested with individual harvesting rights, could benefit from an increasing cod stock as well as from efficiency gains by adjusting inputs and outputs.
The fact that the closure of the coastal cod fishery occurred in 1989 is a combination of two factors. First, the cod stock was strongly depleted as a result of a history of overfishing 2 In practice, there have been quota exchanges, so that the actual division varied somewhat over the years, but the principal agreement on a 50-50 division of the stock is important: it frees the annual negotiations from the frictions that arise from allocational bargaining. The successful cautious cooperation in the arena of fisheries management must be seen in light of the Cold War, where Russia and Norway stood on either side of the Iron Curtain, the exact borders in the Barents Sea were disputed, and a large number of nuclear submarines was deployed in the area (Stokke, Anderson, and Mirovitskaya 1999) . 3 In fact, up to 1984 the quota agreements between Russia (Soviet Union at that time) and Norway stipulated explicitly that the conventional vessels could continue to catch cod even when the total quota was filled. This was repeatedly criticized by the Russian delegation, and the Norwegian authorities yielded to the pressure in the Joint Commission by issuing time restrictions on when harvesting was allowed. Fishing was then prohibited on some Sundays and holidays in the year, and these restrictions had little actual effect. Nevertheless, as a matter of principle, they led to strong protests from the coastal fishers. 4 We thank Peter Gullestad for valuable discussions on the background of the policy change in 1989/1990. and TACs that were too generous (in almost all years the quotas exceeded the already overly optimistic scientific advice, see Figure  A -3 in the online appendix 5 ). Second, the fish were particularly easy to catch in 1989 (both because the weather was good and because the spawning stock at Lofoten congregated in shallow waters). The closure was effected by dividing the coastal vessels into two groups: a Group I that obtained individual quotas, and a Group II that continued to fish under a common maximal quota. Access to Group I was restricted, while access to Group II continued to be open. In line with the political tradition of favoring those fishers with fishing as their sole occupation, access to Group I was based on a minimum catch requirement of the boat (differentiated by vessel length) in one of the years 1987, 1988, or 1989. 6 The vessels in Group II received about 5% to 10% of the total quota, but in many years, the maximal quota for this group was not filled. Furthermore, there have been several rounds of "promotions" from Group II to Group I that-together with other regulatory efforts-aimed at increasing flexibility and reducing state intervention without giving up the political aim of maintaining a diverse settlement pattern in northern Norway. 7 A delicate balancing act! A clear manifestation of the aim to maintain a diverse settlement pattern is the diffi-6 There were in total about 3,500 boats in Group I in the period we consider (NOU 2002) , while there were about 15,000 boats in the entire vessel registry (which includes both industrial trawlers and a large stock of small open vessels, for details see Figure A -2 in the online appendix, available at http://le.uwpress.org). As we describe below, we base our analysis on a sample of boats between 13 and 28 m that are operated year-round and use conventional gear (not trawl or purse seine). Nine of the 588 boat-owner combinations in our sample belong to Group II. 7 In general, it was not the case that management was absent before 1989 and perfect afterward, but rather that it was in a state of flux during this period (Gullestad et al. 2014) . Nevertheless, 1989 Nevertheless, /1990 is recognized as "the great divide" in Norwegian fishery management (Standal and Aarset 2002) . Another regulatory change in 1989/1990 that is worth mentioning is the introduction of a guideline for the division of the Norwegian TAC, the so-called trawl ladder. According to this allocation key, the trawlers obtained between 20% and 35% of the TAC, depending on its overall size. In order to protect the coastal vessels, the share that was given to the trawlers was smaller, the smaller the TAC. culty of transferring vessels and quotas. Initially, boats were not allowed to be sold across municipality borders. This constraint met fierce opposition from the Association of Norwegian Fishermen and was soon changed to a prohibition of vessel trade across county borders. In practice, this limitation was sometimes circumvented by "setting up a post box in the right municipality" (Hersoug 2005, 119) . Individual quotas are given on the basis of vessel length and were not meant to be transferable at all. Nevertheless, quota trade occurred in practice, at least to some extent, as boats have been sold with a quota and then bought back without the quota (Holm and Nielsen 2007) . 8 At this point, we should highlight that the "cod fishery" is in fact a multispecies fishery. Several species are caught as bycatch when targeting cod, but vessels also target different species for different parts of the year, mainly exploiting variations in the availability of fish. In particular, saithe and haddock are important species in terms of quantity and value. The TAC for haddock is decided bilaterally between Russia and Norway, and the TAC for 8 For further information on Norwegian fishery regulation, see Å rland and Bjørndal (2002) or Gullestad et al. (2014) . Hannesson (2013) gives a recent account of Norway's experience with ITQs in the pelagic and demersal fisheries, arguing that the resource rent has been capitalized in boat and quota values. Armstrong et al. (2014) give a good overview of the economic and social issues surrounding the rebuilding of the cod fishery. The Norwegian cod fishery has generally been a popular object of study in the economic literature, from the early work on productivity (Hannesson 1983) to its latest advances (Kumbhakar, Asche, and Tveterås 2013) . It has served as example for calibrated simulations of, for example, the effect of cannibalism (Armstrong and Sumaila 2001) , the importance of age-differentiated management (Diekert et al. 2010) , multispecies aspects (Kvamsdal and Sandal 2012) , and climate change effects (Eide 2007) . The profitability surveys from the Fisheries Directorate are often used in empirical applications. Asche and coauthors (Asche, Bjørndal, and Gordon 2009; Asche 2009 ) study the trawler segment of the fishery to estimate the size of the resource rent (using data from 1997 and 1998) and to test for adjustment cost (using data from 1986 to 1994). Data from 1995 to 2007 for the entire demersal fleet has been used by Guttormsen and Roll (2011) 
III. MATERIALS
The biological data and the numbers for aggregate annual landings are taken from the 2012 ICES report. We point out that when we talk about "observed" stock size, we refer to biomass values that are derived from virtualpopulation analysis, a model-based technique that back-calculates the stock numbers from fishery-dependent (landing statistics) and fishery-independent (research surveys) data. The true error will always remain unknown (as the true size of the fish stock in the ocean is in fact unobservable), but it is clear that the error strongly diminishes through time as more information, in particular on the fish stock's age-structure, becomes available.
The economic data that we use come from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries' profitability surveys, forming an unbalanced panel with information on vessel characteristics, economic variables, the harvested amount, and the harvested value.
The profitability surveys are sent out by mail at the end of each year to all boat owners of "ordinarily well operated and aptly equipped vessels above 13 m in length that are used to fish the whole year." The survey's response rate was between 31% and 34% in 1985-1996 and 27% in 1997 . The surveys inform the annual negotiations between the Norwegian authorities and the Norwegian Fishermen's Association about state subsidies, minimum prices, and other regulations. To the extent that the data in these surveys are self-reported and potentially subject to selection bias, the information should be treated with the appropriate amount of caution. However, as the report of an individual boat owner is one of several hundred, it is unlikely that he or she strategically underreports his or her revenue to induce higher subsidies. In particular, the answers to the survey are not being used for any individually targeted policies or to calculate tax payments. For us, it is important that the survey methodology was not changed with the introduction of individual quotas in 1990. 10 The total number of fishing vessels in Norway has declined from about 24,000 in 1985 to about 13,600 in 1997. The number of vessels that forms the basis of our sample (around 700) stayed stable over this period. These boats contribute by far the largest part of Norwegian landings, both in terms of volume and in terms of value. About 80% of all vessels between 13 and 28 m are operated year-round (see Figure A -2 in the online appendix 11 for further details on the stock of Norwegian fishing vessels).
Our sample contains 668 unique vesselowner combinations over 13 years, giving 1,818 observations between 1985 and 1997 (on average 140 observations per year). In addition, we were able to obtain information on the boat owners from the vessel registry (through the Directorate of Fisheries) and we could match these datasets to create boat-specific histories of ownership. This allows us to 10 The Directorate of Fisheries published annual reports on the basis of these surveys, where aggregated statistics for the different vessel categories (mainly differentiated by length, gear, and main target species) are presented. In these reports, the directorate writes that the sample attrition is considered random and not related to the income level or cost level. In 1982, the directorate made an extensive effort to compare the category-level information in the surveys with other sources, such as the sales register and the social insurance scheme. It has found only very small deviations. This effort was repeated in 1988, and larger deviations-in both positive and negative directions-were found, especially for categories that consist of very few vessels. The concerns that the categorization was no longer representative persisted even after a regrouping in 1994 and the sampling methodology was changed. From 1998 on, the survey was sent out only to a selected sample and reporting was made mandatory (the actual information provided was of course still self-reported). Using the fact that we can identify individual boat owners (see below), we have compared profits from owners that report both in the three years before 1998 and in the years 1998-2000 and have found no significant differences (although reported profits in the latter period are somewhat larger).
11 Available at http://le.uwpress.org.
control for vessel-and owner-specific attributes, and importantly, we can distinguish the fate of those boats that have entered or left the fishery. We do not have information on the individual quota holdings. Therefore, we went through the archives of regulations published by the Fisheries Directorate and collected the information on the individual quotas that were issued for each length group each year and assigned them accordingly. As there is an activity requirement to catch a certain part of the quota to qualify for staying in Group I, we compared quotas to actual catches to determine whether a given vessel belonged to Group I (vessels regulated by an individual quota) or Group II (vessels managed by a maximum group quota). In this way, we identified 9 vessel-owner combinations belonging to Group II, while the remaining 579 vesselowner combinations belong to Group I.
Furthermore, we do not have information on the fuel price faced by a given boat in a given year. We have therefore used a time series of real petroleum prices. 12 Table 1 shows the main variables of the economic dataset (where the capital letter N refers to the total number of observations and the lowercase n refers to the number of distinct boat-owner units). All prices are given in real Norwegian kroner (1 NOK ϳ 0.12 USD at the time of writing). They have been deflated using the consumer price index (1998 = 100) from Statistics Norway. 13 Our key measure of economic performance is short-run profit, defined as the total revenue minus variable costs. 14 In the following, we will use the word "profits" to mean short-run 12 Specifically, the time series of prices for number 2 heating oil, the closest to bunker fuel, issued by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (www.eia.gov/forecasts/ steo/realprices/). Norwegian heating oil prices, available through the Norwegian statistical bureau, are too much influenced by climatic idiosyncrasies in Oslo and other large cities.
13 Table 03014 : Konsumprisindeks; available at www. ssb.no/statistikkbanken.
14 To be precise, we group "work compensation," "provisions," "social cost," "retirement contributions," "fuel cost," "bait, ice, salt, and packaging," and "product tax" as variable costs, whereas vessel depreciation, maintenance, and "other costs" (external accounting services etc.) are grouped as fixed costs. FIGURE 2 Box Plots of Profits in Units of 1,000 Real Norwegian Kroner (1998 Value) profits. Figure 2 shows a box plot of profits from 1985 to 1997 (the thick lines within the boxes show the median, and the black dots show the mean profit in the respective year). The plot highlights the immense variation. The average value of profits in the dataset is NOK 819,000, with a standard deviation of NOK 660,000. The variation between different vessel-owner combinations (SD of NOK 654,000) is much larger than the variation within a vessel-owner combination (S.D. of NOK 197,000).
IV. METHODS

Counterfactual Simulation of Cod Stock
We simulate how stock biomass would have developed if the 1990 regulatory change had not taken place by using (1) a function predicting the aggregate harvest for a given stock biomass; (2) a biological model predicting the size of each cohort the next year, accounting for harvest and natural mortality; and (3) a procedure calculating the number of new fish entering the exploited stock as a function of the reproductive part of the stock, while accounting for the historical environmental conditions.
Harvest
The function that predicts aggregate harvest for a given stock is given by [1] , where H t refers to the harvest during year t, and B t refers to the stock biomass at the beginning of year t.
[1]
Note that we simply search for the most parsimonious empirical relationship with the highest explanatory power. Our interest is in the equation's ability to forecast, and we therefore see [1] as a reduced form of a model of open access in the cod fishery. Our key assumption is that the relationship between stock and harvest would also have been the same after 1989 were it not for the policy change. (Details on the selection of the functional form, its estimation, and the parameter values are in Section A.2 in the online appendix. 15 ) Here we note that the straightforward linear specification is able to explain almost 90% of the variation in the data.
Stock Dynamics
The aggregate stock biomass at time t + 1 is the number of fish at age a at time t + 1 times their average individual weight, summed over all ages:
. The first-
a age-at-recruitment is 3 years for NEA cod, and the oldest age-group A (a so-called plus group, collecting all individuals of age A and above) is 13 years. In order to project the stock biomass to the next period for a given stock and harvest in the current period, we first need to convert the 15 Available at http://le.uwpress.org. aggregate harvest at time t to the harvested biomass of age-class a that is caught at time t. To this end, we assume that the selectivity pattern does not change with the regulatory regime. 16 Denote the observed aggregate fishing mortality by F t (which is given by the ratio of aggregate harvest to aggregate biomass F t = H t /B t ), then the age-specific selectivity can be inferred from H a,t = s a F t B a,t . Thus, the counterfactual harvested biomass at age is calculated bŷˆĤ = s F B .
[2] a,t a t a,t
The counterfactual stock-numbers-at-age are calculated according to equation [3] , N a,t which means that we assume that fishing occurs instantaneously in the middle of the year, and natural mortality occurs evenly M a,t throughout the year. The values for natural mortality are taken from the ICES report (2012, table 3.17; = 0.2 for most a,t). To M a,t translate the counterfactual harvested biomass into catch-numbers-at-age, we have to divide the harvest-at-age by the average individual weight-at-age w a,t , where we assert that the individual weight-at-age does not change with the regulatory shift. Although it seems intuitive that growth is slower at high stock levels and for NEA cod, weight-at-age is indeed negatively correlated with abundance, the causal mechanism is uncertain; evaluating biotic and abiotic determinants of cod growth, Ottersen, Helle, and Bogstad (2002) find that environmental conditions that are correlated with strong recruitment also displace the new year classes farther east into colder water masses, where prey abundance is low and growing conditions are adverse. As environmental conditions have not changed due to the policy change, we employ the yearly values as they are given in the ICES report (2012, + N e − e .
[3]
A,t ( )
Finally, the number of recruited fish (at age 3) is needed. To this end, we must isolate the influence of the (endogenous) spawning stock biomass from the (exogenous) environmental forces determining recruitment. The link between biomass and recruitment is assumed to follow the Beverton-Holt form (Ohlberger, Rogers, and Stenseth 2014) :
where the parameters a and b are obtained from a nonlinear regression of the number of recruits on the spawning stock biomass (SSB).
(Regression estimates are given in the online appendix. 17 ) Since NEA cod is considered to recruit to the fishery at age 3, the relevant spawning stock biomass is the one three years earlier. 18 The counterfactual spawning stock biomass will differ from the observed values and will hence drive a wedge between the counterfactual and the predicted recruitment values. However, we add the observed timespecific residual from the regression to the log of the recruitment values. The residuals are, by assumption, independent of the stock size and capture random environmental fluctuations (climatic or oceanographic conditions, predator and prey abundance, etc. 19 Note that the residual would also pick up changes in recruitment that are due to other policy changes that aimed at protecting juvenile fish but had no impact on harvest (such as stricter bycatch regulations in a related fishery). In their review of the management of this fishery, Aglen et al. (2005) We use a multiplicative lognormal error structure, which can be justified for several reasons. First, from a technical perspective, the explained variable can take only positive values. This is particularly important for the simulation, where negative recruitment values could occur if an additive model structure were applied. Second, from a statistical perspective, the multiplicative model gives the better fit (see Section A.3 in the online appendix 20 ). Third, from a mechanistic perspective, the total survival from egg to recruit is the product of the probability of many smaller survival events (Quinn and Deriso 1999) , which implies a multiplicative error structure. Figure 3 illustrates the simulation procedure. The left panel shows the observed scatter of SSB versus abundance at age 3 three years later. The gray line shows the fitted Beverton-Holt function. The right panel shows one hypothetical simulation step: Suppose the observed SSB at time t − 3 was at 650,000 tons. The stock-recruitment function predicts that there would be around 700 million recruits, while due to environmental conditions the actual observed recruitment was 1,300 million individuals. If now the counterfactual SSB at time t − 3 were at 250,000 tons, the stock-recruitment function would predict around 462 million recruits, but by multiplying the observed residual, we end up with a counterfactual recruitment of 925 million individuals.
The simulation has been implemented in R 3.1.1 (R Development Core Team 2014). In order to quantify the uncertainty surrounding our simulations, we run a thousand simulations where we, for each time step, add an error to the harvest and to the residual of the recruitment function. The former is a randomly drawn residual from the harvest remention the following changes: In 1984 efforts were undertaken to limit the bycatch of juvenile Gadidae in the shrimp fishery. In 1992, efforts were undertaken to limit the bycatch in the capelin fishery, and in 1993 a sorting grid was introduced in the shrimp fishery. However, bycatches in these fisheries are considered to be negligible in relation to other sources of juvenile mortality (Bogstad, Yaragina, and Nash 2016) . In fact, the capelin stock was essentially collapsed in the period from 1993 to 1997. 20 Available at http://le.uwpress.org. gression, and the latter is taken from a normal distribution with a standard deviation corresponding to the estimates of the 0-group abundances obtained from the Barents Sea ecosystem survey (Anonymous 2011) . Uncertainty in growth and mortality is not accounted for because we assume that the policy change had no effect on these processes.
Estimation of Policy Effect on Profits
The second objective of our study is to estimate the effect of introducing individual quotas on profits. In the parlance of a "program evaluation" approach, we want to estimate the average treatment effect for our study period: Profits, π i,t , are generated by some unknown process. We describe this process by a linear approximation to the log-transformed profits as a function of output prices, the inputs labor and fuel, and the biomass of the harvested fish stocks (in the actual estimations we retain only the cod stock). That is, we presume a simple Cobb-Douglas profit function, which we have chosen because it proved to be sufficiently robust for extrapolating. 21 While we allow for systematic vessel-owner specific differences, for example due to skipper skill or location of the home port, we assume that all other factors are not systematically related to the observed profits. Formally, counterfactual profits are calculated according to 21 A "transcendental logarithmic (translog) function" (Lau 1978; Squires 1987 ) is more flexible and allows accounting for second-order interaction effects, but it is not useful for extrapolating in our case (due to overfitting). Additionally, the Cobb-Douglas function has the advantage that the elasticities are directly obtained from the estimates of the regression coefficients. 1990...1997] .
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[5]
The coefficients and are estimated bŷ α β i regressing: [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] . It allows the input-and output-coefficients to be different before and after the intervention. In addition, we control for the quota holding (in tons) Q i,t of individual i at time t. The coefficient is set β Q to zero in the counterfactual projection ([5] ).
Estimates are obtained by applying ordinary least squares with fixed effects (the "within" option in the "plm" package in R; Croissant and Millo 2008) directly to the profit function described in equation [6] . We thus exploit duality to avoid the endogeneity problem that arises when using labor and capital as a proxy for effort (Gordon 2015) . Consequently, the exogeneity of prices and the fact that the individual firm adjusts inputs and outputs are important maintained assumptions. As the products from the demersal fish species are either a small part of the larger world market for white fish, or go to the specialized market for dried fish, where the final price depends much on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the individual fish and the weather during the drying period, this assumption is likely to hold for the output prices. The assumption that the amount of employed labor is fixed in the short run is perhaps more problematic, but clearly the decision of how many men to employ has to be made before the fishing trip. Using wages is not an alternative, as labor remuneration is directly linked to harvest, due to the share system. Our fixed effect controls for capital, but we cannot estimate its effect. With respect to fuel, we do not have information on individual prices and were therefore forced to use an annual index that is the same for all units. 22 The advantage of this is, of course, that this index is not influenced by individual decisions. Finally, we control for the biomass of the cod stock, but not for other species. We have decided against including the biomass of the haddock or the saithe stock firstly because models that included them had higher Akaike information criterion values and secondly because the coefficients for the haddock and saithe stock, respectively, were not statistically significant. Note that this leads to an implicit assumption that the biomass of the other targeted species has no systematic effect on profits.
V. RESULTS
Counterfactual Simulation of Cod Stock
Was the increase of the cod stock due to good luck or due to good management? In order to answer this question, we have projected how stock biomass would have developed if the relationship between stock and harvest after 1990 had been the same as before 1990. The line with solid circles in Figure 4 gives the actual observed stock development, while the line with open circles shows the counterfactual cod stock. The dashed lines plot the 95% simultaneous confidence bands
FIGURE 4 Observed Values (black line) and Counterfactual Simulation of Cod Stock (gray line with open circles);
Resampled Paths (gray lines) Are Used to Gauge the Uncertainty of the Simulation (Schweder and Hjort 2016) . A sample of the hundred paths used to generate these confidence bands is in the background. The policy has had a positive effect on stock biomass: the observed stock is significantly larger than our counterfactual projection of the stock biomass in the absence of intervention. Nevertheless, it appears that the main part of the post-1990 increase in the stock size was independent of the policy change. Three drivers are identified in the literature (see, e.g., Godø 2003; Hjermann et al. 2007 ). First, a recovered capelin stock (the main prey of cod) in the early 1990s significantly improved the feeding conditions and consequently reduced cannibalism. Second, warmer temperatures generally benefited cod (which lives at its northernmost boundary in the Barents Sea). Third, oceanographic conditions were favorable in this period as they predominantly transported cod larvae into nutrient-rich waters.
Note that the effect is not as crystal clear as one may have hoped; the observed stock development overlaps with the 95% simultaneous confidence band in some years (in particular in the beginning, which is expected because of the filtering effect of the fish stock's age structure). A one-sided confidence band at the 94% level is entirely below the observed stock trajectory or just touches it.
Estimation of Policy Effect on Profitability
Did the stricter enforcement of the TACs and the introduction of individual quotas have a significant positive effect on profits? To answer this question, we fitted a profit function to data from 1985 to 1997, controlling for quotas and including dummy variables for the postpolicy period. We derive counterfactual profits by projecting this function but setting the coefficients of the quotas and postpolicy dummies to zero, as well as employing the counterfactual cod biomass instead of the observed biomass. Figure 5 shows that the policy change of 1989/1990 led to a significant increase in profits, in particular after three to four years. This pattern conforms exactly to what we would expect from theory. In the first years, the reduction of harvest due to the quota constraint has a negative effects on profits that is only partially canceled by an increasing stock and other beneficial effects of the policy change. In the later years, the net effect is clearly posi- tive as-in addition to learning and other efficiency enhancing adaptations-the stock has grown further and individual quotas have increased accordingly, so that now more can be harvested from a healthier resource stock. Table 2 presents the results of the fixedeffects regressions of the profit function. The baseline case when the entire sample is used is given in column (1), whereas column (3) presents the results from the robustness check of using only those vessel-owner combinations that have been observed before and after the change. (Corresponding to Figure 5 , we present average observed and counterfactual profits for this restricted sample in Figure A -10 in the online appendix. 23 ) Columns (2) and (4) show the results when we have added a time trend to the regressions of columns (1) and (3), respectively.
The key observation from Table 2 is the positive and highly significant effect of individual quotas. Indeed, the individually harvested amount of cod has increased strongly and monotonically after 1990 (see Figure 6A ). In line with the comparison between the observed and counterfactual profits, this indi-23 Available at http://le.uwpress.org.
cates that the efficiency gains from the policy reform unfolded over time. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to decompose changes along the intensive and extensive margin by an elaborate structural model (as in, e.g., Reimer, Abbott, and Wilen 2014) , in the second part of Section VI we investigate how the policy change has led to increased profits. In short, we argue that participants, having secured rights to harvest, could adapt the allocation of inputs and outputs to minimize cost and maximize profits (in addition to benefiting from an increased cod stock).
VI. DISCUSSION Alternative Mechanisms Leading to an Increase in the Cod Stock
Our simulation of the counterfactual cod stock relies on aggregate data from the ICES report. The estimated impact of the policy could therefore be unrelated to the introduction of individual quotas in the Norwegian coastal fishery.
First, it could be that it was the Russian (Soviet) harvest that decreased after the fall of the Iron Curtain. We have collected data on Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of boat-owner combination. Fixed effect within regression. AIC, Akaike information criterion.
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.001.
quotas and harvest on a country-by-country basis. The data clearly show that the Russian harvest did not fall after 1990; to the contrary, it increased (see Figure A -4 in the online appendix 24 ). In fact, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the ensuing reorientation from a "tonnage ideology" to the market and after the phasing out of fuel subsidies, the Russian fleet was much more interested in harvesting high-value cod in the nearby Barents Sea (Hønneland 2006) . Second, it could be that the reduction in harvest was due only to the more conservative setting of the TAC and stricter enforcement. While the agreed quotas were indeed closer to the scientific advice and the degree of overfishing was reduced, we show that quotas were set in excess of the scientific advice and overfishing was also prevalent after 1989/ 1990. On average, quotas were 27% larger than the scientific advice before 1990 and 13% larger than the scientific advice after 1989. Harvest has, on average, exceeded quotas by 10% before 1990 and by 5% after 1989 24 Available at http://le.uwpress.org.
( Figure A-3 in the online appendix 25 ). However, when quotas and harvest are analyzed on a fleet-by-fleet basis, it becomes clear that it was overfishing by the Norwegian conventional fleet that was stopped after the 1989/ 1990 policy change ( Figure A-4 26 ). After 1989, that fleet's harvest never exceeded the quota.
Moreover, we have subjected our model to two placebo tests as a falsification strategy (see Section A.5 in the online appendix 27 ). That is, by applying the model to units that have not actually been treated, we learn whether the reported results could be driven by the model's inability to replicate the true data. In other words, if our method of constructing a counterfactual cod stock is correct, we should not see a large deviation between counterfactual and actual stock estimates when assuming that the policy change would have happened in 1980 or 1985. Indeed, we find no significant difference between the ac- In conclusion, we argue that the policy change in 1989/1990 is likely to have had a positive effect on stock development, but that the fluctuations in the cod stock are driven primarily by environmental factors. 29 This somewhat ambiguous finding is in line with previous difficulties of establishing clear positive ecosystem effects of ITQ management (Branch 2009; Chu 2009) . It also reflects the recent work of Rouyer et al. (2011) , who argue that the qualitative changes of the stock's properties, in particular its age-truncation, have increased the importance of climatic conditions for stock dynamics. Further, Kjesbu et al. (2014) find, in their words, "synergies between climate and management" when investigating the introduction of the harvest-control-rule in 2007.
How the Policy Change Has Increased Profits
We now turn to a discussion of the underlying drivers of the observed profit gains. While there is some evidence of capacity ex-pansion, as vessels that newly enter the fishery tend to be larger than the old vessels that leave the fishery (more on this below), there is no sign of technological improvement for the existing vessels (Standal and Aarset 2002) . In columns (2) and (4) of Table 2 , we have accounted for technological change by including a time trend. The coefficient is not significantly different from zero, neither in the full sample, nor in the sample of those boats that are observed both before and after the policy change.
Also, the alternative explanation of higher postreform output prices that is common in North American fisheries (Grafton, Squires, and Fox 2000; Fox et al. 2003; Dupont et al. 2005) cannot account for the observed increases in profits. As Figure 6B shows, we do not see that prices increased after the introduction of individual quotas. The reason is probably that the pre-ITQ regulations in many North American fisheries led to extremely short harvesting seasons, so that there was much to gain from alleviating these adverse market effects. In Norway, the availability of fish has always been determined by the spawning migration and other environmental fluctuations. The harvesting season was never so extremely short that latent potential gains were not present to the same extent. 30 Furthermore, the absence of a significant coefficient of the dummy for the price index of other species shows that there are no signs of an increased importance of unregulated species as the cod fishery becomes regulated (in contrast to the Norwegian pelagic fleet; see Asche, Kumbhakar, and Tveterås 2007) .
Rather, the introduction of individual quotas allowed the firms to avoid a costly "race to fish." Analyzing the elasticities (which, for a Cobb-Douglas profit function, are conveniently given by the regression coefficients), we see that the responsiveness of individual vessel profits to the fuel price declined significantly after the policy change. Similarly, while a 1% change in labor use was associated with about a 1.04% change in profits before 1990, a 1% change in labor use was associated with only about 0.39% change in profits after 30 We thank Frank Asche for discussion on this point. the policy change (see Table 2 , column 1). As Abbott, Garber-Yonts, and Wilen (2010) , we find little evidence of changes in the share of labor cost to revenue. While the overall amount of labor (measured in man-years) was increasing before 1990, it dropped with the policy change and then stayed stable (see Figure 6C) . The number of operating days per vessel has declined after 1989/1990 (see Figure 6D) . The more effective use of labor that we uncover is in line with the anecdotes that boat-owners took turns in working at each other's boats. Such beneficial trade was possible only once harvest was secured through individual quotas.
In addition to the cost-saving changes in fuel and labor use, we observe a more efficient adaptation of the output structure over time. The simultaneous increase in the variance of cod harvest per boat with its mean indicates that the quota was initially binding for all vessels, but as the quota increased this constraint became nonbinding for an increasing number of vessels that also target other species. 31 Further evidence for an increased specialization in harvest can be found when analyzing the histograms of the share of cod in the total harvest before and after the policy change ( Figure  7A ). The mean of these two distributions is virtually the same (0.455 before and 0.458 after the intervention, see also Table A-1 in the online appendix 32 ), but the distribution is single peaked before 1990 and bimodal after the introduction of individual quotas. The hump at the lower end of the distribution after the policy change is clearly related to the requirement to catch a certain fraction of the annual 31 An additional reason for the observed increase in spread in harvest is that the difference between the quotas for small boats and large boats increased. For example, in 1990, the individual quota for vessels between 13 and 14 m was about 30 tons, for vessels between 19 and 20 m and for vessels between 27 and 28 m, the quota was 62 tons. In 1994, vessels between 13 and 14 m received a quota of 80 tons, whereas vessels between 19 and 20 m received a quota of 157 tons, and for vessels between 27 and 28 m, the quota was 219 tons. In 1997, these numbers were 157 tons for vessels between 13 and 14 m, 380 tons for vessels between 19 and 20 m, and 530 tons for vessels between 27 and 28 m. However, this differentiation of quota increases is not sufficient to explain the spread in observed cod harvest per boat ( Figure A-6 For those vessels that shift away from targeting cod, there is no clear pattern to which fishery they turn. Some turn to pelagic species, some to saithe and flatfish; for others again the value of "other species" increases (which most likely means participation in the emerging crab fisheries). Furthermore, Figure 7B reveals something very interesting, namely, that the participation in the seasonal fishery around Lofoten increased after the introduction of quotas. 33 Harvesting the spawning stock around the Lofoten archipelago has always been the most lucrative (and most competitive) part of the Norwegian cod fishery. The marked increase in participation points to the important effect of asset security. With their individual quota in hand, more fishers found it worthwhile to take the trip to Lofoten. Incidentally, the Lofoten reports (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 1990) also mention a marked decrease 33 The fact that the participation in 1990 has increased compared to 1989 but not reached later levels can be explained by the reportedly adverse weather in that year (see the Lofoten report, Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries 1990) as well as with the fishers' hesitant and observant reaction to the new quota system. in damages, gear collisions, and violations of area restrictions as a welcome side effect of the individual quota system.
Finally, we document adjustments in the fleet structure that led to an increase in average profits. First, we compare vessels that enter the fishery (either by replacing exiting vessels or through the limited rounds of "recruitment" sanctioned by the authorities) with the stock of existing vessels (Table A-2 in the online appendix 34 ). There are 36 newly built vessels in our postpolicy sample and an additional 10 vessels that enter the directorate's boat registry from other sources (most likely purchased abroad). These 46 vessels are of course more modern, but they are also larger (in terms of tonnage, not length). They employ about the same amount of labor and effort (in terms of operating days), but they harvest significantly more and are less specialized for catching cod. The annual profit of these new vessels is higher than the average of the incumbent vessels in six out of eight years.
Second, we show that adjustments within the fleet of existing vessels led to higher profits. In total, there are 225 ownership transi-tions recorded in our dataset. Figure 7C shows how the rate of ownership transitions increases from close to zero to about 30 to 40 boat sales per year after 1994. For 72 of these transitions, we observe the same vessel when operated by the old and by the new owner. When regressing the Cobb-Douglas profit function (controlling for the identity of the individual vessel) where we include a dummy variable that is set to 0 for the old owner and set to 1 for the new owner, the coefficient for this variable is positive and significant at the 10% level (see Table A -5 in the online appendix 35 ). Thus, vessels that have changed owners are operated more profitably by their new owners than by their old owners.
Investigating the effect of the 1989/1990 policy change on the investment pattern and industry dynamics (Nøstbakken 2012; Schnier and Felthoven 2013) is an important task for further research, especially as the introduction of private rights to exploit public resources was (and still is) a contested political issue. The finding that new owners operate their boats more profitably than old owners, for example, speaks against the widespread practice of grandfathering harvesting rights to existing firms, at least when there are reasons to believe that industry exit is sluggish or transferability of quota rights is limited. Auctioning harvest rights, in contrast, would not only improve efficiency in this regard, it could also reduce the contention that a select group of rights holders benefit from a resource that belongs to the "public." At the same time, it would be naïve to think that the transfer of wealth implied by an auctioning mechanism would not meet fierce opposition from the affected groups.
In sum, moving from a situation of de facto open access to an individual vessel quota system coupled with a more strictly enforced TAC has led to a significant increase in profits, mainly because fishers adjusted inputs (including vessels) and outputs. Clearly, gains were higher toward the end than in the beginning, but calculating the average treatment effect and summing over the whole period 1990-1997, we arrive at an efficiency 35 Available at http://le.uwpress.org. gain of NOK 980,000 per vessel (in 1998 value; 95% confidence interval: NOK 119,000-1,841,000). Extrapolating to the population of conventional vessels that are operated year-round, this makes an aggregated total of NOK 745 million (95% confidence interval NOK 159-1,332 million) over the eight years from 1990 to 1997. 36
VII. CONCLUSION
Fisheries are maybe the canonical arena to investigate performance under various forms of institutional regimes. Theory tells us that rents are dissipated and fish stocks are depleted under open access (Gordon 1954) , while well-defined harvesting rights give rise to considerable profits and high stock values (Scott 1955) . Real-world processes are evidently much more complex than the theoretical dichotomy of rent dissipation and rent maximization. Nonetheless, cross-sectional studies have indeed identified negative effects of open access (McWhinnie 2009) and positive effects of secure rights-based management (Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008; Grainger and Costello 2014) . These studies document convincingly that policies that delineate harvesting rights to individual users are associated with better performance, but they do not address the causal mechanism at work. Clearly, the 1989/1990 policy change in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery established a harvesting right that is far from the textbook example of perfect ITQs. 37 In the spirit of program evaluation, we argue that introducing individual quotas and simultaneously enforcing the TAC improved the profitability of the coastal fisheries in Norway and strengthened their sustainability.
We find that the change from open access to individual quotas and enforced TAC has had a significant but comparatively small ef-36 This number would be higher, but also more uncertain when extrapolating from the sample of boat-owner combinations that are observed both before and after the policy change. Total gains from the reform over the 8-year period would then be at NOK 765 million with a 95% confidence interval of -0.3-NOK 1,876 million. 37 For a discussion of the legal concept of a "property right" and the question of whether an ITQ can constitute such a right, see Bromley (2016) . fect on the cod stock. The main part of the observed increases in the resource base appears to have been due to favorable environmental conditions. Analyzing a detailed dataset over 13 years with information on vessel and owner characteristics, we show that the policy change led to a sizable increase (about 15%) in total short-run profits over the period from 1990 to 1997. Strongly put, an average vessel gained about NOK 1 million (in 1998 value) over the period 1990-1997 due to the policy reform. Because fishers had more secure harvesting rights after the policy change, they could avoid a costly race to fish and exploit gains from specialization, as well as economize on labor inputs. The increase in profits unfolded over time. Initially the positive effects of the policy reform were outweighed by the negative effect of a constrained harvest. With time, both the cod stock and individual quotas increased, so that overall profits became higher than they would have been without the policy change.
